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On 10 August 1375 a convoy of English ships intent on loading salt in the Bay of 
Bourgneuf, off the coast of Poitou, was set upon by a powerful fleet of Castilian galleys. 
According to a contemporary chronicle, in the ensuing sea battle seventy-two large English 
ships were taken, some of which were subsequently burned. We learn nothing more from 
this source, save that this was ‘the greatest loss of ships that England ever suffered’.1 A 
petition put forward at the parliament of 1376 by England’s port towns, accompanied by a 
schedule of losses, adds substance to this dramatic but sketchy story.2 The schedule pro-
vides details of thirty-six vessels that had been ‘taken and burned’ by ‘the men and galleys 
of the Bastard of Spain’. The tonnage and estimated value (including cargo) of each ship 
allow us to assess the magnitude of the losses, which all told came to over 4400 tons of 
shipping worth £18,175 sterling. The identification of home ports and ship owners reveals 
how the resultant ‘damage and ruin’ was distributed among coastal communities. As for the 
fate of the masters and mariners onboard these ships: the petition states merely that they 
were killed, which – judging by the crews employed shortly before and the tonnage of the 
ships – suggests that perhaps as many as 1000 men were lost. 
The parliamentary petition offers an explanation of the circumstances that led to the de-
bacle in the Bay of Bourgneuf. It is claimed that the ships were originally requisitioned to 
transport Thomas Felton, seneschal of Gascony and William Elmham, governor of Bayonne 
to Aquitaine. This was service at the king’s wages, upon completion of which the ships’ 
masters were free to pursue commercial opportunities. Believing themselves protected by 
the truce of Bruges, which had begun on 2 August, they sailed into the Bay of Bourgneuf to 
load salt ‘for the provisioning of the realm’ of England. As the Castilian galleys’ attack was 
clearly in breach of the truce, the petitioners urged the king to secure ‘restitution and re-
dress’ for those who had been ‘greatly damaged and ruined’, their expectation being that he 
would order the commercial property of his ‘enemy of Spain’ to be seized. Presented in this 
way, the whole episode illustrates rather well both the tense intermingling of duty, oppor-
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tunity and hazard that attended the maritime community’s participation in the king’s war, 
and – with the stakes so high – the necessity of controlling the narrative. Indeed, whether 
through dishonesty or incomplete understanding, it is evident that the petitioners were not 
telling the whole story. It is not so much the scale of the reported losses that raises doubts, 
for in terms of ships lost the shipowners’ claims appear modest by comparison with the 
chroniclers’ testimony, but rather the circumstances that led to the battle in the Bay. First, 
that the Castilian attack was actually in response to the pillaging of Spanish ships by ‘four-
teen English barges’, as narrated by a French chronicler, is a version of events that should 
not be dismissed out of hand;3 though since the king of Castile did not consider himself 
bound by the truce, justification on grounds of retaliation was hardly necessary for his ad-
miral.4 Second, the movements of the English ships immediately prior to their loss in the 
Bay were more varied and complex than the petitioners admit. It is unlikely that more than 
a handful of them would have been needed to ship Felton and Elmham to Aquitaine.5 In-
deed, twenty-three of the thirty-six ships that were lost can be found on the payroll of the 
fleet that had transported an army of 4,000 soldiers to Brittany in April.6 (Eighteen of these 
twenty-three ships, held on arrest at the king’s pay, had been awaiting embarkation since 
the autumn.) Most of the others were doubtless in these waters on purely commercial busi-
ness. Two, the Gabriel of Southampton and the Paul of Rye, can be glimpsed shipping 
wine from Bordeaux during the previous winter, and the Gracedieu of Dartmouth had left 
that port on 20 May, about 12 weeks before meeting its end in the Bay.7 
The precision with which the losses suffered in the Bay of Bourneuf were documented 
at the time allows us to assess the significance of this maritime reverse. The crown’s capac-
ity to raise fleets for fighting or logistical purposes may have been affected to some degree, 
but to argue that the loss ‘would be felt by requisitioning officers for years to come’ would 
be to exaggerate.8 Twenty-one of the lost ships had a carrying capacity of 100 tons or more, 
and so might be considered large, but this represents fewer than ten per cent of the ships of 
that size recorded in the naval pay rolls from 1369 to 1380. Indeed, of the eighty ships of 
100 tons or more in the Brittany transport fleet, mentioned above, fewer than 20 per cent 
were subsequently lost in the Bay. If this was indeed ‘the greatest loss of ships that England 
ever suffered’, it was nevertheless a blow that the English war effort could sustain without 
buckling. However, as is usual in war, the impact of these maritime losses would have been 
felt more keenly at local level, within port towns and maritime communities, than in the 
warlords’ council chamber. A nuanced assessment sensitive to local circumstances, includ-
ing the ports’ wider involvement in the king’s war, cannot be attempted here; a brief sketch 
must suffice. Fifteen different port towns suffered losses in the Bay. The greatest blows 
were meted out to Bristol and Great Yarmouth, each of which lost six ships; but measured 
in terms of tonnage, Bristol’s total loss (1029 tons), inflated as it was by three very large 
vessels (215, 200 and 170 tons), was more than double Great Yarmouth’s (470 tons) – an 
apt reflection of the contrasting fortunes of, on the one hand, a thriving commercial and 
                                                 
3 Chronique des quatre premiers Valois (1327-1393). Ed.: Luce, Siméon. Paris, 1862. 255. 
4 Sumption, Jonathan: Divided Houses. The Hundred Years War, vol. III. London, 2009. 238–239. 
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manufacturing centre of 12,000 souls, which at this time was making a healthy contribution 
to the crown’s naval needs and, on the other, a port whose east-coast dominance in fishing 
and shipping was in now in decline.9 While it was more usual for a port to lose one or two 
ships, the impact that this had on maritime communities surely varied a great deal. For 
Dartmouth, the loss of two ships, while regrettable, would not have been crippling for a 
port that was, at this time, the leading supplier of shipping to royal fleets, including no 
fewer than twenty-eight of the vessels in the Brittany transport fleet of April 1375.10 On the 
other hand, the loss of the Seintmariebote of Bradfield, which had been picking up salt in 
the Bay for a decade, would have been a devastating blow for this small coastal community 
in Essex. Rarely called upon by the king’s agents to provide naval service, Bradfield may, 
at a stroke, have lost a quarter of its men-folk in August 1375.11 
If Bristol and Bradfield occupied opposite ends of the spectrum of maritime communi-
ties affected by the disaster in the Bay, Ipswich was in all senses at the mid-point: a busy 
port town of about 2,900 people,12 which lost three ships, the Marie (100 tons), the Magda-
len (150 tons) and the Trinity (100 tons). As such, Ipswich and its role in the king’s war 
merit closer scrutiny, an exercise that will be pursued for the remainder of this article. All 
three ships had served in the army transport fleet that reached Brittany in April, along with 
a fourth vessel from Ipswich, the Nicholas (90 tons), which appears to have escaped the 
disaster in the Bay.13 The Marie and the Magdalen were owned by Geoffrey Starling, who 
for several years as a contractor had played an active – and hitherto perhaps profitable – 
part in the semi-privatised naval war. But the £686 13s 4d that he now claimed as the value 
of his lost ships and their cargoes was a huge sum, even for the most prominent family in 
Ipswich.14 Along with Richard Lyons, financier and owner of two London ships lost in the 
Bay, and the powerful lobby of Bristol shipowners, Starling was probably a prime mover 
behind the parliamentary petition. He no doubt felt that he deserved redress, for together 
with Richard Haverland, owner of the Trinity of Ipswich, Starling had been a loyal support-
er of the king’s war effort at sea. All three ships had combined commercial seafaring – 
shipping wine from Bordeaux – with service in army transport fleets in 1369 and 1373.15 
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Indeed, the largest of the three vessels, Starling’s Magdalen, was additionally deployed in 
fleet escort and coastal patrolling roles.16 With a double crew of fifty mariners, further 
stiffened by thirty archers and thirty armed men, the Magdalen would have been a formida-
ble warship. And herein lies part of the explanation of her fate in August 1375: on that 
occasion she carried no more than a normal commercial crew, which would have stood 
little chance against the armed might of a Castilian galley. 
Turning to the crews of these three Ipswich vessels: the seventy-seven mariners who 
had served on the voyage to Brittany in April,17 and who presumably stayed on, were al-
most certainly all killed in the Bay of Bourgneuf. Although mariner lists for the ships are 
lacking, as the crews were of conventional, commercial size, we can safely assume that, for 
many of the mariners, home and family were in Ipswich. Some indication of who they were 
is provided by a return of mariners resident in the town in the summer of 1372, which rec-
ords the names of sixty men, of whom forty-six were at sea at the time of the survey.18 
Twenty of them were currently serving on the Trinity, Richard Haverland’s 100 tons vessel 
that would be lost in the Bay three years later. Thirteen of the sixty, including eleven at sea, 
can be found on a list of the greatly expanded, armed crew of the Magdalen in 1374, a year 
before that ship was lost.19 Although evidently offering an incomplete view of the pool of 
mariners working out of Ipswich in 1372, the return is nonetheless instructive. It shows 
how the simultaneous service of several ships would draw heavily on local manpower and 
that the destruction of those vessels would therefore cast a deep shadow across the town. 
Indeed, assuming a degree of continuity in the crews of the three ships that were lost in the 
Bay, perhaps as many as half of the sixty Ipswich mariners recorded in 1372 did not make 
it home in 1375. 
The simultaneous loss of three large ships and their crews through enemy action may 
well have been an unprecedented maritime tragedy for Ipswich, but by 1375 the people of 
that port town were well accustomed with the implications of taking an active naval role in 
the king’s war, whether through performance of logistical tasks for the crown – transporting 
men, horses, and supplies – or combative ones, as fleet escorts or warships for patrolling 
and offensive operations. The survival of naval pay records in bulk allows us to trace Ips-
wich’s contribution of ships and mariners in some detail. The Scottish wars from the 1290s 
to the 1330s required naval support for the shipping of supplies, patrolling, blockades and, 
occasionally, amphibious operations, but the demands placed on individual ports were 
usually modest. The two ships that Ipswich sent to the fleet deployed at the siege of Ber-
wick in 1319 was typical of what was asked of this port town, the six briefly employed in 
an east coast fleet in 1327 more unusual.20 But with the onset of the war with France in 
1337 the crown’s demands increased significantly, driven by the need to assemble large 
fleets to ship armies across the Channel. Ipswich contributed twenty ships to the transport 
fleet of nearly 400 that sailed to Antwerp in July 1338, sixteen to the fleets shipping armies 
                                                 
16 TNA, E 101/32/28; E 101/32/29. 
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to Brittany in 1342, and twelve to the huge armada of over 700 vessels assembled in 1346 
to transport Edward III’s army to Normandy.21 Smaller numbers were called upon on other 
occasions;22 and during the 1350s and ’60s, Ipswich continued to support major logistical 
operations, the peak turnouts being in 1355 (8 ships), 1359 (11) and 1369 (13).23 There-
after, the crown’s strategy demanded greater emphasis on sea-keeping operations involving 
smaller, but more heavily armed ‘fighting’ fleets, a development in which Ipswich shipping 
readily participated. 
The surviving records suggest that, during the period 1319-89, over two hundred voy-
ages were made in the king’s service by Ipswich ships. We can see that there was a good 
deal of repeat service by individual ships and masters, but can only guess what proportion 
of the ocean-going vessels based in Ipswich were called upon to serve. In c. 1340, the bail-
iffs of the town reported that it was home to twenty-four vessels, but how comprehensive 
that survey was is unclear.24 Equally uncertain is how far the town’s fleet was affected by 
either the demographic shocks caused by successive plague visitations or by the attritional 
effects of naval service. That said, the naval contributions made after 1348 suggest that if 
the number of vessels available had indeed diminished, the shrinkage was not proportionate 
to the fall in the town’s population.25 Two further conclusions may be offered. The first is 
that the demands made on Ipswich’s shipping were broadly propor-tionate to those made on 
other east coast ports of comparable size and wealth. The second conclusion concerns the 
three Ipswich vessels lost in the Bay of Bourgneuf in 1375. While the scale and likely im-
pact of that loss is broadly contextualised by reference to the numbers of Ipswich ships 
employed by the crown on other occasions in the French war (as discussed above), if we 
sharpen the focus and examine the records for service performed in 1369–1375 we find that 
the vessels lost in the Bay constituted a third of the nine distinguishable Ipswich ships of 
100 tons or more that had been engaged in naval service during those years. 
On occasion, these naval roles involved heavy financial outlay for the people of Ips-
wich, most notably when they were ordered to build and equip warships for the king’s ser-
vice. A community receiving such an order in the 1370s could expect to spend more than 
£200 on a single vessel.26 In 1372–1373, the bailiffs of Ipswich were able to share the cost 
of building a barge with the neighbouring ports of Colchester and Hadleigh, but they still 
found it difficult to raise the necessary funds from their own townsfolk.27 When the barge 
subsequently joined a royal fleet in 1377, its crew served at the king’s wages,28 as was 
normal for requisitioned ships during this period. Payment at the standard rates – 6d per day 
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for ship masters, 3d for mariners, with, from the 1370s, a 6d per week bonus often being 
paid – resulted in major injections of cash into local economies;29 but for much of the peri-
od, the terms of royal service were less favourable for shipowners. They were rarely com-
pensated if their ships were damaged or lost while in the king’s service. The crown was 
unusually generous following the Brittany campaign of 1342–1343, and John Irp, owner of 
at least three ships in the early 1340s, received 10 marks in compensation for damage sus-
tained by his ship, the George. But he was the only Ipswich shipowner to benefit in this 
way and several others were fined for unauthorised withdrawal from the same fleet.30 
Moreover, it was only from the 1380s that the crown regularly offered a ‘wear and tear’ 
allowance (‘tunnetight’) for ships taken into royal service, initially paid to shipowners at 
the rate of 3s 4d per quarter year for each ton of carrying capacity (£16 13s 4d per quarter 
for a 100 ton ship).31 Potentially more advantageous for the shipowner were the freightage 
payments that were sometimes offered to those willing to deploy their vessels on patrol or 
as escorts. To engage the services of the Magdalen of Ipswich as an escort for the Bordeaux 
wine fleet during the winter of 1372–1373 the crown paid freightage at the favourable rate 
of 22s per ton. Geoffrey Starling was thereby assured the equivalent of a good commercial 
return from a potentially risky voyage.32 
The crown’s willingness on this occasion to pay freightage for convoy escort duty high-
lights how, from the shipowners’ perspective, participation in the king’s war involved not 
only the risk of damage in sea combat, but also missed trading opportunities. The four Ips-
wich ships that eventually served in the April 1375 army transport fleet had been held idle 
in port for over six months prior to departure, at a time when wine could have been shipped 
from Bordeaux.33 It was no doubt usual for shipowners, where possible, to follow up a spell 
of naval duty with a commercial venture, but engagement in commerce was itself a poten-
tially hazardous activity at this time. While the port of Ipswich never experienced a fero-
cious maritime raid of the kind that devastated Winchelsea in 1360, its ships were ever 
vulnerable to predation on the high seas by organised squadrons of French and Castilian 
galleys or privateers. In 1336, Thomas Debenham lost his 160 ton ship, the Katherine of 
Ipswich, worth 200 marks, when it was audaciously seized, just off the coast at Orford, by 
the men of Calais.34 In these circumstances, maritime trade could only be maintained at 
increased cost to those involved, as vessels were double-manned to enhance security, and 
with the constraints on commercial freedom that were imposed by having to sail in con-
voys. Seaborne trade was affected in other ways by the war, notably by the damage to wine 
production caused by campaigning in Aquitaine. During the 1370s wine exports from that 
region dropped to about a third of the level of the previous decade, the period of the peace 
of Brétigny.35 
                                                 
29 Kowaleski, Maryanne: Warfare, Shipping op. cit. 253. 
30 TNA, E 372/192, mm. 29-29d. 
31 The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England op. cit. VI. 179-80; Sherborne, James: English Navy op. 
cit. 31; Kowaleski, Maryanne: Warfare, Shipping op. cit. 241. 
32 TNA, E 101/32/28. 
33 TNA, E 101/33/31, m. 6. 
34 Calendar of Close Rolls: Edward III, vol. III, 1337-1339. 43–45. 
35 James, Margery K.: Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade. Oxford, 1971. 15–33. 
‘The greatest loss of ships that England ever suffered’... 31
Historians are as yet some way from reaching an understanding of how the shipping 
and maritime communities of port towns like Ipswich were affected by the multi-
facetted challenges presented by intermittent, but often intensive warfare, complicated 
as they were by a socio-economic context that was destabilised by successive plague 
visitations and often by environmental change and commercial competition as well. 
Even when the data for naval and commercial voyages have been fully assembled and 
analysed, how these inter-related challenges were perceived and conceptualised by the 
actors in our drama – from shipowners, like Geoffrey Starling, to ordinary mariners – 
will continue very largely to elude us, except in so far as we are able to draw conclu-
sions from their actions. With reference to our central concern, namely the impact of 
the debacle in the Bay of Bourgneuf in 1375, the actions of Ipswich’s maritime com-
munity speak volumes. For while we may be sure that the loss of three ships and their 
crews was felt with particular intensity, the capacity for recovery and the resolve to 
return to the fray are quite as striking. As we have seen, Ipswich appears to have lost at 
least a third of its large vessels (i.e. those of 100 tons or more) in 1375, but nine distin-
guishable ships of that carrying capacity were deployed by the port in support of the 
king’s naval war during the 1380s.36 Year after year, Ipswich continued to supply 
ships, up to half a dozen at a time, for army transport duties (as in 1380) and, in partic-
ular, for fleets tasked with a fighting role. The owners of vessels in paid royal service 
had a right to a quarter share of the value of prizes taken at sea, with half going to the 
master and crew.37 For men hardened by a treacherous and unremitting working envi-
ronment, the prospect of rich booty and prize money would have made service in these 
fighting armées especially appealing. The earl of Arundel’s viage de guerre in 1387 
certainly met their expectations. At the battle of Margate/Cadzand, the earl’s armée of 
51 vessels overhauled a much larger Franco-Flemish wine fleet and captured about 40 
ships laden with 5,000 tuns of wine.38 With the veteran shipmaster Henry Fyn at the 
helm, the George of Ipswich (160 tons) took part in Arundel’s triumph.39 The welcome 
accorded to this ship upon its safe return home can be easily imagined, and it is small 
wonder that three large Ipswich vessels, the George, the Margaret and the Michael, 
signed up for Arundel’s next voyage the following year.40 What we surely see in Ips-
wich’s experience is the capacity of a resourceful, flexible and resilient community to 
make the best of the king’s war as it was being fought in the 1370s and ‘80s. And per-
haps – as has been noted elsewhere – there is some indication here that warfare, for all 
its deleterious consequences, could serve as a stimulus for ‘investment in shipbuilding, 
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in town defences and quayside facilities, and in the training and employment of a 
whole range of maritime workers’.41 
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